天保工程建设：中央与地方政府投资博弈  

Nature Forest Protection Project:Game of Central and Local Government

作　　者：刘德权[1,2] 杨磊[3] 

机构地区：[1]东北林业大学,哈尔滨150040 [2]哈尔滨商业大学,哈尔滨150025 [3]黑龙江科技学院,哈尔滨150027

出　　处：《林业经济》2008年第3期48-50,共3页Forestry Economics

基　　金：黑龙江省博士后经费资助项目(编号：LRB05—017)

摘　　要：通过构建我国中央与地方林业投资的博弈模型，深入分析了两类利益主体所处的数种纳什均衡，借以探讨了在“天然林保护工程”实施中地方林业配套资金难以落实的问题，并查找原因，提出建议。Setting up the game theory model of forestry investment between the central and the local, the paper deeply analyzes two kinds of interesters in some Nash-equilibrium. Using these theories, it discusses the problem of local quota financing which always is difficult to fulfill in the Nature Forest Protection Project, and find some reasons, put forward some advices.

关 键 词：林业 投资 利益 博弈 

分 类 号：F326.2[经济管理—产业经济]