不确定需求下供应链合作广告与订货策略的博弈  

Game analysis of cooperative advertising and ordering strategies in a supply chain under demand uncertainty

作　　者：傅强[1] 曾顺秋[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2008年第3期56-63,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

摘　　要：基于报童类型产品的二级供应链结构,放宽了市场需求为确定性的假设,引入了订货量这一决策变量,先后考察了Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈时制造商与零售商的最优广告策略及零售商的最优订货策略,比较了不同博弈均衡下的策略选择及系统期望利润,探讨了市场需求随机性对制造商与零售商广告投入水平的抑制作用.并利用Nash讨价还价理论对合作利益进行了分配.最后,通过一个数学算例验证了有关结论.Based on the two-echelon supply chain structure of newsboy-type-product, this paper relaxes the assumption that the market demand is certain, and introduces a decision variable - ordering quantity. We investigate the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇s optimal advertising strategies, retailer＇s optimal ordering strategies of the Stackelberg leader-follower game and Nash co-op game respectively, and compare the strategies selection and system expected profits in the two game equilibrium. Meanwhile, we discuss the restraint effect of demand uncertainty on advertisement expenditures of the manufacturer and the retailer. Then the Nash bargaining model is utilized to determine the allocation of the co-op profit. Finally, a numerical example is given to confirm the relevant conclusion.

关 键 词：供应链 合作广告 订货 博弈 讨价还价 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]