基于预算与佣金约束的排污权关联价值拍卖机制  

Research on Emissions Permits Affiliated Value Auction Model in the Conditions of Commission and Budget Constraints

作　　者：李寿德[1] 黄采金[1] 顾孟迪[1] 邝山[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2008年第1期56-59,共4页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573073);国家社会科学基金资助项目(03BJY040)

摘　　要：建立了基于预算与佣金约束的排污权关联价值拍卖模型,并分析了佣金与预算约束条件下排污权关联价值拍卖机制中厂商的均衡出价策略、投标数量以及厂商、环保部门和拍卖行的期望收益等问题。结论表明,在排污权关联价值拍卖机制中,无论佣金是常数还是成交价格的线性函数,厂商的期望收益都不变。This paper establishes an auction model with commissions and budget constraints, and analyzes bidding strategies, bidding amount, and the expected benefits to firms, environment protection administrations and auction agencies under the affiliated value auction mechanism. The result shows that commissions and budget constraints have effects on firms＇ bidding strategies and the expected benefits of environment protection administrations and auction agencies

关 键 词：排污权 拍卖 佣金 关联价值 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]