Cournot和Bertrand竞争下均衡质量的比较  

Comparing the Equilibrium Quality between Cournot and Bertrand Competition

作　　者：杨树[1] 梁樑[1] 熊立 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,合肥230026 [2]中国移动通信集团上海有限公司人力资源部,上海200134

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2008年第1期104-109,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金资助项目(70525001)

摘　　要：使用两阶段博弈模型对比了数量竞争(Cournot)和价格竞争(Bertrand)下的均衡质量。双寡头竞争情况下的理论分析结果显示,不同的市场条件具有不同的对比结果,而多寡头情况下的算例分析则揭示Cournot竞争比Bertrand竞争具有更高的均衡质量。Comparison of cournot competition and bertrand competition has been widely undertaken in the academic literature. In recent years, production quality has played a more significant role in increasing market competition. It is especially important to understand how quality is influenced by different types of competition. This paper presents a comparing analysis of equilibrium quality in cournot competition and Bertrand competition through the two-stage game models. It is found that different conditions lead to dif- ferent results in duopoly situation, while numerical computation releases that quality in cournot competition is higher than that in bertrand competition in oligopoly market.

关 键 词：数量竞争 价格竞争 质量 

分 类 号：N945[自然科学总论—系统科学]