上市公司控制权转移的演化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Controlling Right Transferring of Listed Companies

作　　者：邓晓卫[1] 唐齐鸣[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2008年第6期61-67,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(06SJB630008)

摘　　要：在演化博弈理论的框架下建立了控制权转移的接管机制模型.在具有不完全信息的控制权市场,将控制权争夺的参与者分为两个群体:接管者(进入者)群体和管理者(在位者)群体,他们随机配对进行不对称两人博弈.接管者选择进入和不进入且其特性有强、弱之分,在位者选择合作和抵制.通过建立复制者动态模型并对其均衡点进行分析,得到了控制权转移的路径及接管者与管理者的最优策略.A takeover mechanism model of controlling right transferring is constructed adopting evolutionary game theory in this paper. In the market for corporate control with asymmetric information, parters competing for controlling rights are classified as takeover people （entrants） and current managers （dominators）, they are stochastically matched and play asymmetric two-person game. Takeover people are either strong or weak and choose whether to enter or not, and current managers will choose to cooperate or resist in succession. By constructing duplicator dynamic model and analyzing its equilibrium point, the path of controlling rights transferring is depicted theoretically and optimal strategies of both sides are gained, which are practically helpful for regulating controlling rights transferring of listed companies.

关 键 词：控制权市场 控制权转移 演化博弈论 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6