具有可数个局中人的连续凸对策的核心  

The Core of Continuous Convex Games with Countable Many Players

作　　者：王振吉[1] 刘微[1] 李靖[2] 封梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北化工医药职业技术学院基础部,河北石家庄050026 [2]石家庄铁路职业技术学院计算机系,河北石家庄050041

出　　处：《河北师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2008年第2期162-164,共3页Journal of Hebei Normal University：Natural Science

基　　金：河北省自然科学基金(A2005000301)

摘　　要：将稳定集的定义扩展到局中人集合为可数集的凸联盟对策中,并证明若局中人集合可数集的凸联盟对策在总的联盟是连续的,那么它的核心是唯一的von Neumann-Morgenstern稳定集.The definition of stable set to convex coalitional games is extended with a countable set of players and shows that if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, then its core is the unique yon Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.

关 键 词：von Neumann-Morgenstern稳定集 联盟对策 核心 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]