反垄断从宽处理制度及其中国化  

The Leniency Program in Anti-monopoly Law and Its Sinolization

作　　者：李俊峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学法学院,上海200444

出　　处：《现代法学》2008年第2期70-79,共10页Modern Law Science

基　　金：上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金项目"私人实施反垄断法问题研究"(编号B.37-0106-07-702)

摘　　要：反垄断从宽处理制度旨在减免公法责任以吸引卡特尔成员主动投案并揭发他人的违法事实,是国际上通行的一种发现和打击卡特尔的有效机制。从宽处理制度分为多种类型,其共同的先决条件有三个,即:提出申请、提供有效信息、完全配合反垄断执法机构的查处。中国具有与该制度相契合的传统法律土壤,也具备建构该制度的现实法律依据。但是,我国反垄断法律体系内部的冲突、执法权归属的模糊、行政法律责任的薄弱与缺失等因素,使得该制度在中国的实施面临隐忧。Diminishing or exempting public law responsibility to persuade cartel members to surrender or charge against other person＇ s illegal acts, the leniency program in anti-monopoly law has proved itself as an effective mechanism available internationally to investigate and crack down on cartels. Although the leniency program can be divided into many categories, all of them have to meet three requirements ： applying for leniency firstly, offering reliable information, and cooperating with anti-monopoly authorities. China has a legal tradition similar to the program and has a solid legal foundation conducive to establishing such a program. However, the program＇ s carrying out may be hindered because of conflicts within antimonopoly statutory framework, lack of specific provision that who shall exercise the enforcement power and the fact that some executive personnel have no sense of law and responsibility.

关 键 词：反垄断 卡特尔 从宽处理 中国化 

分 类 号：DF414[政治法律—经济法学]