银行代收费业务中付费委托方知情权保护策略的博弈分析  

The Client's Right to Know in the Bank Bill Payment Service:An Approach Based on Nash Equilibrium

作　　者：李容华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国计量学院法学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2008年第1期80-85,共6页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

摘　　要：信息经济学的研究成果表明,由于委托——代理双方信息的不对称性,使委托方的风险远高于代理方,因此,民商法保护委托方的知情权;但是,从纳什均衡的分析模型看,我国银行代收费业务中对付费委托方知情权保护的策略无疑是最差或次差的。这表现在付费委托方知情权意思表示策略和有关默示值设置策略两方面。为此,从纳什均衡论出发,有必要改进付费委托方知情权意思表示策略和默示值设置策略。Because of the unbalanced information, the client takes a higher risk than the agent, so civil and commercial law protects the client＇ s right to know. But from the perspective of Nash equilibrium, the strategy designed to protect the client＇ s right to know in the bank bill payment service in China is extremely inefficient. The inefficiency manifests itself in both intention-manifestation strategy and tacit approval. Based on Nash equilibrium, this paper proposes some suggestions to improve the strategy of the bank bill payment service.

关 键 词：银行代收费 委托——代理 知情权 博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F760.5[经济管理—产业经济] F832.2