董事报酬、独立性与公司治理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Toward Director Compensation,Board Independence,and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from China Listed Companies

作　　者：宋增基[1] 徐叶琴[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2008年第2期95-105,共11页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金项目"企业理论"(项目编号:70525005);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目"股权结构;公司治理与公司绩效关系综合性研究"(项目编号:20050611013)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文利用中国上海和深圳证券交易所上市公司2003-2005年的数据,实证分析了董事报酬结构和董事会独立性之间的关系,并在考虑董事报酬内生性基础上,进一步检验了董事报酬、独立性和公司绩效的关系。研究结果发现,长任期的CEO、CEO兼任董事长、较大比例的内部董事和较大的董事会规模构成了中国上市公司的监管障碍。董事报酬是一种公司治理的强化机制,当董事会保持独立时,其报酬结构能更好的激励董事履行监管职能。但是,当董事会失去其独立性时,其报酬结构会加剧公司的代理冲突。授予董事会合理的激励报酬可以克服公司监管障碍,提高公司治理水平。We empirically examine the relationships between director compensation,board-of-director independence,and corporate performance with the endogeneity of director compensation using a sample from China Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.We find that the long-tenure of CEO(who may chair the board),higher proportion of inside directors and larger board may lead to monitoring impediments for China listed companies.The results imply that director compensation consists of reinforcement to corporate governance.Shareholders' interests can be better protected with the independence of board of directors,and the compensation mechanism exacerbates agency problems in these firms without the independence of the board.Finally,we propose recommendations that the grant of director incentive compensation can overcome monitoring impediments and improve corporate governance.

关 键 词：董事报酬 独立性 公司治理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224