不可诉补贴的国际经济学分析  

The International Economical Analysis of the Non-Actionable Subsidy

作　　者：沈大勇[1] 刘佳[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外贸易学院国际经贸研究所

出　　处：《世界经济研究》2008年第3期56-63,共8页World Economy Studies

基　　金：上海市重点学科(第2期)资助项目(编号为T1201)

摘　　要：补贴是各国财政支出的重要组成部分,是政府用以促进国内经济发展和增强本国产品国际竞争力的一种政策工具。不过,补贴的实际运用往往会产生双重的效应。世贸组织的《补贴与反补贴措施协议》,旨在有效地规范成员国的各种补贴政策,从而营造一个公平的贸易环境。本文拟从其对补贴的定义与分类的依据入手,重点就不可诉补贴的原理和影响机制进行国际经济学的分析和研究,进而探讨中国合理使用不可诉补贴的政策举措。Subsidy is an important function of expenditure in every government,and is also one of the policy means for the government to boost domestic economical development and increase the International competitiveness of products in the home and abroad.However,the application of subsidy has both positive and negative effects.The purpose of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is to regulate Member's subsidy policies and make a fair trading environment.The article starts from the definition and categories of subsidy,following that it analyzes the principle and mechanism of influence of the non-actionable subsidy,finally it discusses China's policies of reasonable application of the non-actionable subsidy.

关 键 词：补贴与反补贴措施协议 不可诉补贴 战略性贸易政策 对中国的启示 

分 类 号：F744[经济管理—国际贸易]