房地产金融流动性风险中的银企博弈研究  

On the Game between Banks and Real Estate Enterprises in Liquidity Risk of Real Estate Finance

作　　者：周毕文[1] 程嘉许[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第2期8-10,16,共4页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：近年来随着房地产金融的逐渐展开,金融机构的流动性风险也在逐年增大,并且其逐渐演化为影响金融机构的各种风险的综合性结果。银行与房地产企业的博弈过程影响着银行机构的流动性,其博弈结果影响着银行机构的流动性风险水平。文章通过建立银行与房地产开发商之间的不完全信息动态博弈,分析了银行与房地产企业之间的博弈过程,阐释了银行与房地产企业在不同条件下的选择模式,并提出对策,以防范化解银行机构的流动性风险,从而保障房地产金融业的健康发展。In recent years, with the gradual expansion of real estate finance business, the liquidity risk of financial institutions increases year by year, which gradually evolves into the comprehensive results of various risks impacting the financial institutions. The game process between banks and real estate enterprises affects the liquidity of financial institutions greatly, and the outcome of game also influences the liquidity risk level of banks. By establishing the dynamic game with incomplete information between banks and real estate enterprises, this paper fully analyzes the game process between banks and real estate enterprises, then explains the choice models between bank and real estate enterprises under different conditions, and proposes countermeasures to the liquidity risk of banks so as to ensure the healthy development of real estate finance industry.

关 键 词：房地产金融 流动性风险 银企博弈 

分 类 号：F830.572[经济管理—金融学]