多任务代理下地方政府行为取向研究  

The Multitask Principle of Local Government's Behavior

作　　者：朱红琼[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经学院财政与公共管理学院,贵州贵阳550004

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2008年第2期84-87,共4页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：从中央对地方政府的激励机制出发,分析了在"经济人"假设下地方政府的行为受激励机制的影响,并通过实证分析证明了地方政府重视基础设施建设而轻视科教文卫等支出;地方政府从追求"社会合意"型向追求"中央合意"型转变。地方政府的这一行为取向影响到公共品供给效率,以致带来某些公共品提供不足而某些公共品供给过度等后果。This paper maintains that the behavior of local government is affected by incentive mechanism under the supposition of ＂economic man＂, and the local government emphasizes the investment of infrastructure while ignoring the input in education, science,culture, and public health facilities. That is to say, the local government prefers ＂central government satisfaction＂ to ＂social satisfaction＂. Such preference affects the efficiency of the use of public goods, resulting in the shortage of some public goods and the oversupply of other public goods.

关 键 词：多任务代理 地方政府 行为取向 

分 类 号：F810.7[经济管理—财政学]