生产成本可变的两级供应链协调模型  

Two-echelon supply chain coordination model with variable production cost

作　　者：胡旭升[1] 曹宗宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥230009 [2]安徽农业大学应用数学研究所,合肥230036

出　　处：《上海海事大学学报》2008年第1期7-11,共5页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70471045)

摘　　要：为实现生产商利润最大化和供应链系统完美协调,针对由单一生产商和单一零售商构成的两级供应链系统,在确定市场需求和产品生产成本受生产能力影响的情况下,研究作为Stackelberg博弈主导方的生产商如何利用批量折扣机制来激励零售商合作,从而改善供应链协调性问题.给出作为理性Stackelberg的主导者,生产商如何提供批量折扣契约的一类生产成本可变的两级供应链协调模型,以实现自身利润最大和供应链系统的完美协调,并通过算例进行验证.理论分析结果和数值实验结果都表明该折扣模型对改善供需双方绩效和供应链运作协调十分有效.To maximize supplier profits and perfect the coordination of supply chain, for a two-echelon supply chain system consisting of a single producer and a single retailer, the problem of how the producer as a leader in Stackelberg game uses quantity discount mechanism to encourage the retailer cooperation so as to improve the supply chain performance under the constant market demand and variable production cost is studied. As the leader of the theoretical Stackelberg, the producer provides the two-echelon supply chain coordination model with variable production cost to realize the greatest profit and perfect supply chain coordination, through the proving of the numeral experiment. Numerical experiment and thoretical analysis results show that this discount model is considerably effective in improving the coordination of the supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 生产成本 数量折扣 STACKELBERG博弈 协调 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]