高速公路车辆严重超载的博弈分析及其治理  

Game Analysis and Governance Program of Phenomena of Serious Overloading Vehicles on the Highway

作　　者：徐维军[1] 刘德海[2] 袁泽沛[3] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640 [2]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025 [3]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《经济管理》2008年第7期71-75,共5页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目“在线金融租赁竞争策略分析研究”(20060400221)。

摘　　要：高速公路超载问题是困扰我国公路建设的难点问题。本文运用主观博弈模型和动态博弈模型,分析了交通管理部门、稽查工作人员和运输业主之间的复杂博弈关系。研究了造成交通秩序混乱的原因在于各利益相关方的"激励悖论"和"共谋"行为,讨论了为什么交通管理部门整治后仍出现短期内良好秩序和长期屡禁不止的混乱秩序,提出了高速公路超载现象的综合治理方案。It is very difficult problem about overloading of vehicles in China＇s highway construction. In this paper, using the subjective game model and the dynamic game model, we analyze their complex game relationships among the traffic management departments, the inspection staffs and the transport owners. First, we point that the cause of the traffic order chaos is brought by the＂incentive Paradox＂ and＂conspiracy＂ of the various stakeholders. And then we analyze the cause of the existing phenomenon that there will be good order in the near future after management but the chaos order in the long-term again. Finally, the paper presents the comprehensive management program on the overloading phenomenon of highway.

关 键 词：高速公路 超载现象 主观博弈模型 动态博弈模型 

分 类 号：F506[经济管理—产业经济]