拟阵上合作对策的单调解  

Monotonic Solution of Cooperative Games on Matroids

作　　者：何华[1] 孙浩[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学应用数学系,西安710072

出　　处：《应用数学学报》2008年第1期52-60,共9页Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.70571065);陕西省自然科学基金(No.2007A09)资助项目

摘　　要：本文主要介绍了拟阵上的合作对策Shapley解的结构,并利用强单调性、交换性、概率有效性等三条公理刻画了拟阵上合作对策Shapley解的唯—性.同时讨论了本文的三条公理与Bilbao等人的四条公理的等价性.最后给出拟阵上合作对策核心的定义及其结构.The Shapley value for cooperative games on matroids is recalled and is characterized by three axioms of strong monotonicity, substitution and probabilistic efficiency, which are equivalent to the axioms of linearity, substitution to unanimity games, P-dummy player property and probabilistic efficency. The structure of element of core for cooperative games on matroids is presented.

关 键 词：拟阵 合作对策 SHAPLEY值 强单调性 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]