从葛梯尔反例看知识与真信念的关系  

On the Relation between Knowledge and True Belief from the Point of View of Gettier's Counterexample

作　　者：闫景强[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2008年第4期25-29,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：葛梯尔反例表明,传统的知识定义未能真正把握知识与真信念的关系。现有的葛梯尔反例的解决方案虽然各具特色,但也不能解决上述问题。我们对信念理由和真理理由做出了必要的区分,认为葛梯尔反例产生的根本原因在于信念理由和真理理由的分离。我们提出了知识的实践定义,在实践基础上把信念理由和真理理由统一起来,从而解决了知识与真信念的关系问题。Gettier＇s counterexamples showed that the traditional definition of knowledge can＇t grasp really the relation between knowledge and true belief. The present methods to solve Gettier＇s counterexamples take on their merits respectively, but can＇t accomplish the task, too. We draw a necessary distinction between belief reasons and truth reasons, and consider the fundamental cause of GettielCs counterexamples is sepa- ration of the two former reasons. At last, we put forward the practical definition of knowledge, unite the two former reasons on the basis of practices, and solve the problem of the relation of knowledge and true belief.

关 键 词：葛梯尔反例 信念理由 真理理由 知识的实践定义 

分 类 号：B023[哲学宗教—哲学理论]