对一类无证书签名方案的攻击及改进  

An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme and Its Improvement

作　　者：曹雪菲[1] Kenneth. G. Paterson 寇卫东[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学综合业务网理论及关键技术国家重点实验室,西安710071 [2]Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报》2008年第2期64-67,141,共5页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士学科点专项基金项目(20040701001)

摘　　要：给出了对一个已有的高效无证书签名方案的替换公钥攻击,表明了在该方案中,攻击者可以通过替换签名者公钥伪造签名;进而针对该攻击提出了改进方案.改进方案将用户单一公钥替换为公钥对,增加了公钥有效性验证,简化了签名产生算法,在随机预言机模型下具有存在性不可伪造性.That a presented proposal of efficient certificateless signature scheme is insecure against public key replacement attack is demonstrated. It is shown that an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures for the signer without knowledge of the signer＇s private key. Then the scheme is improved by replacing the original public key with a public key pair. It enables a verifier to check the validity of a signer＇s public key pair by simplifying the signature construction. The improved scheme is proven secure against existential forgery under the random oracle model.

关 键 词：无证书签名 替换公钥攻击 密钥托管 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]