两个生产商的逆向供应链演化博弈分析  

A study of the evolutionary game of two manufacturer's reverse supply chain

作　　者：王玉燕[1] 李帮义[2] 申亮[3] 

机构地区：[1]山东财政学院工商管理学院,济南250014 [2]南京航空航天大学经济管理学院,南京210016 [3]山东经济学院,济南250014

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2008年第4期43-49,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(05BTJ016);江苏省研究生科技创新基金(XM06-142)

摘　　要：采用演化博弈方法研究逆向供应链在企业供应链中的推广应用,结果表明:在市场机制下,只有当生产商实施RSC时能够获得额外收益,RSC才能逐渐被市场接受,反之,生产商将消极对待RSC,这时就需要政府采取一定措施进行干预,对于市场中生产具有负的外部效应的生产商采取惩罚机制迫使企业接受RSC,对于生产具有正的外部效应的生产商采用财政补贴激励企业实施RSC.最后用数值分析证实了研究结果的正确性.Reverse supply chain begins to get more and more social concern since it plays an increasingly important part in preventing environmental pollution and resource waste, and in promoting the performance of enterprises. The article, through the approach of evolutionary game, attempts to study the universal application of reverse supply chain in the supply chains of enterprises. The findings show that under the market mechanism, RSC is acceptable to the market provided that manufacturers could get extra profit from implementing RSC; otherwise, they would take an inactive attitude towards RSC. Therefore it requires the necessary measures of intervention by the government： to establish a punishing mechanism for those manufacturers with production of externally negative effect so as to guarantee the acceptance of RSC, and to provide those manufacturers with production of externally positive effect with financial subsidies as a motivation for the implementation of RSC. Finally, the paper proves the legitimacy of the research findings by numerical analysis.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]