控股股东代理与企业内生破产  

Controlling shareholders agency and corporation endogenous bankruptcy

作　　者：宋小保[1,2] 刘星[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2008年第2期161-167,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372041;70772100)

摘　　要：用实物期权方法分析了基于企业价值最大化与基于控股股东价值最大化下企业不同的破产/清算时机选择,并重点分析了控股股东获取控制权私利程度对企业破产/清算触发的影响.结果表明,与无负债企业的清算决策相比,负债企业的破产触发较早;与无控股股东企业相比,存在控股股东情况下的企业破产/清算触发较晚,企业价值降低.而且随着控股股东控制权与现金流权分离程度的增加,破产/清算触发更晚.随着控股股东现金流权的增加,企业破产/清算触发逐渐提前.In this paper real options methods are used to analyze different bankruptcy/liquidating timing based on corporation maximizing valuation and maximizing controlling shareholders valuation , in which the impact of controlling shareholders＇ benefit of control on the bankruptcy/liquidating timing is analyzed specially. Result shows that contrast to pure equity corporation, the corporation with debt financing has early bankruptcy timing, which results in valuation loss; contrast to the corporation without controlling shareholders, the corporation with controlling shareholders has late bankruptcy/liquidating timing and lower corporate valuation. Moreover, with the increase of separation of the control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders, bankruptcy/liquidating will be triggered more lately. With the increase of cash flow right of controlling shareholders, bankruptcy/liquidating will be triggered more early.

关 键 词：控股股东 破产 清算 实物期权 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]