跨界取水水资源费征收的博弈分析  

Game analysis on water resources fee imposing of inter-provincial water withdrawal

作　　者：胡明[1] 杨永德 雒文生[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室,湖北武汉430072 [2]长江水利委员会水政水资源局,湖北武汉430010

出　　处：《水利学报》2008年第4期506-510,共5页Journal of Hydraulic Engineering

摘　　要：目前跨界取水水资源费征收工作中征收主体与征收标准不明确,导致出现相邻两省分别按照各自标准同时征收的局面。本文在中央与地方博弈分析的基础上,构建了相邻两省在不向中央上缴水资源费、向中央上缴以及中央对上缴实行返还三种情况下的博弈模型,分析了不向中央上缴时两省争收的必然性,探讨了实行上缴和上缴并返还两种政策时,改变争收局面的可能性以及上缴与返还比例应满足的条件,并进行了实例应用。通过分析可知:实行上缴并返还的政策,并选取适当的上缴与返还比例,不仅可以平衡两省的利益,改变争收局面,也能使中央与地方实现合理的利益分配。The game theory is applied to establish the models for analyzing the allocation of imposed fee of inter-provincial water withdrawal among central government and local governments. Three models are proposed. In the first model total water resources fee is kept by the local governments. In the second model a part of resources fee should be handed to the central government. In the third model a part of resources fee handed to the central government from local governments should be returned to the local governments. The inevitability of benefit dispute between provinces if both provinces do not hand in the water resources fee to the central government is analyzed. The possibility of minimizing the dispute using the second or third model is also analyzed. It is concluded that the best mode is to return part of fee handed from the local governments and to find an appropriate ratio of returning fee.

关 键 词：博弈论 水资源费 跨界取水 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]