马克思的经验主体观：从批判施蒂纳的角度看  

Marx's View of Experiential Subject, Investigated on His Criticizing Stinner

作　　者：刘森林[1] 龚庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学,广东广州510275

出　　处：《学术研究》2008年第4期25-30,共6页Academic Research

基　　金：全国百优论文基金项目“现代性的批判性澄清”(200301);教育部基地重大项目“马克思主义实践哲学研究”(05JJD720015)资助

摘　　要：从马克思与施蒂纳相互批判的视角来看,马克思使用的"现实的人"的概念,可以解释为经验主体。对它的解释离不开与之相对的纯粹主体概念。马克思与施蒂纳都致力于精神、幽灵的肉身化,但思路迥然不一:施蒂纳试图彻底消解精神,马克思却执著于某些本质性精神的真正普遍化实现。所以,完全取消了超验维度支撑的经验主体不是马克思主张的主体,倒像是施蒂纳赞赏的"唯一者"。在这个意义上,说马克思彻底拒斥了近代形而上学或本质主义,显然是给了他过多荣誉的误识。The concept of‘real human being’ adopted by Karl Marx can be interpreted as‘the subject of experience’in the perspective of mutually criticizing between Karl Marx and Max Stinner. But it is difficult to interpret the subject of experience without an opposing concept of‘pure subject’. Both Marx and Stinner had dedicated themselves to the incarnation of‘spirit’and‘ghost’,though each took a totally different way. Stinner tried to eliminate spirit drastically, while Marx was persisting in the universal actualization of some essential spirits. So, the subject of experience, which annuals a transcendental dimension absolutely, is not the subject that Marx claims, but rather the only applauded by Stinner. In this sense, what Marx considered as utterly rejectingmetaphysics or essentialism is really an misunderstanding endowed too much‘honor’with him.

关 键 词：主体 人 纯粹主体 经验主体 现实的人 超验维度 幽灵 

分 类 号：B0-0[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学]