政策性银行商业化改革的博弈分析  

The Game of Policy Bank's Business-oriented Reform

作　　者：陈文夏[1] 

机构地区：[1]审计署驻上海特派员办事处,上海200032

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2008年第5期14-17,共4页Financial Theory and Practice

摘　　要：三大政策性银行的体制改革已经进入关键阶段,是走商业化道路还是继续保持政策性经营,理论界仍存在较大分歧。本文在对我国政策性银行改革的进程、原因和一些主要观点进行梳理的基础上,以完全信息下动态博弈作为理论框架,构建了两银行模型、多银行模型和考虑政策性业务社会效益的两银行模型和多银行模型,并对模型的结论进行分析,提出政策建议。It is the key stage of the three policy-based banks＇ reform. There are still different opinions about whether to go the commercial way or still keep the policy dealings. Firstly, we discuss the course, reason and some main ideas of the policy-based banks＇ commercialization. Secondly, we set up four models under the framework of the dynamic game theory of perfect information. Finally, we analyze the results of the models and bring forward some policy suggestions.

关 键 词：政策性银行 商业化改革 完全信息下动态博弈 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]