保险交易诚信博弈与风险—利益均衡控制——基于内生交易费用的保单定价视角  

作　　者：张维龙[1] 张海川[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学保险学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《保险职业学院学报》2008年第2期5-9,共5页Journal of Insurance Professional College

摘　　要：诚信是实现保险公平交易的基本原则。但在信息不对称条件下,保险交易双方就必然围绕逆选择和道德风险而展开定价博弈,产生引致性内生交易费用。本文通过对保险交易的诚信博弈分析,进一步探讨了交易中的保单定价博弈问题,进而探讨了信息不对称条件下保险市场交易总体和个体的利益控制与福利损益问题。Credibility is one of the fundamental insurance principles, which will help to maintain the fair insurance premium and optimize insurance resource allocation. But under the asymmetric information, in order to avoid any loss, both the two parties of the insurance deals will attend the gamble about adverse selection and moral hazard, and will have to accept the induced endogeneous transaction cost. This paper studies the credibility gamble firstly, then analyzes the pricing gamble, at last studies the problem of individual and social welfare.

关 键 词：诚信 不对称信息 内生交易费用 逆选择 道德风险 

分 类 号：F84[经济管理—保险]