巨灾保险市场失灵原因及巨灾的公共管理模式分析  

An analysis on failure of the catastrophe insurance market and the publil management model on catastrophes

作　　者：张庆洪[1] 葛良骥[1] 凌春海[2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学,上海200092 [2]中国人寿保险股份有限公司上海分公司,上海200021

出　　处：《保险研究》2008年第5期13-16,共4页Insurance Studies

摘　　要：巨灾风险不仅对当今人类社会造成了巨大威胁,也对商业保险公司提出了巨大挑战。传统理论认为,导致巨灾市场失灵的原因主要在于信息不对称,但实质上其影响相对有限。导致市场失灵的客观原因在于资本市场不完善和流动性不足,而主观上则要归咎于保险公司的模糊厌恶和公众的过度反应。巨灾风险管理需要政府和商业保险公司的积极合作。建立我国巨灾保障机制的对策:建立巨灾准备基金;政府充当"临时贷款人",提供临时流动性;建立巨灾共保体,形成行业性风险分散渠道;发行巨灾债券,进一步分散风险;加强制度建设,提高商业保险公司积极性。Catastrophe risks not only pose tremendous threat to human society, but also an immense challenge on commercial insurers. Traditional theories hold that the failure of catastrophe insurance market lies with information asymmetry. However, this impact is quite limited in fact. Objective causes for the market failure is the inadequacy of the capital market and lack of liquidity,and subjective causes are insurers＇ ambiguity aversion and public overreaction. Managing catastrophe risks requires cooperation between government and commercial insurers. The paper proposes to establish the catastrophe insurance mechanism in China, set up a catastrophe provision fund, with the government acting as＂temporary lender＂ providing temporary liquidity. It also suggests to establish a catastrophe co-insurance mechanism to spread the risks, issue catastrophe bonds for further risk spread, and enhance relevant policies and systems to mobilize enthusiasm of commercial insurers.

关 键 词：巨灾风险 市场失灵 政府干预 

分 类 号：F840.65[经济管理—保险]