含退出期权的动态联盟控制路径规划  

Research on the control path planning of dynamic alliance containing exit option

作　　者：卢丽娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510640

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2008年第5期37-46,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70472041)

摘　　要：股权控制与关系管理是联盟控制的主要方式.围绕联盟效益和稳定的平衡,根据博弈理论从动态视角研究联盟的控制决策.研究结果表明,在动态博弈框架下,联盟的控制特性及稳定性与企业退出期权的持有能力有关.持有退出期权的企业将在联盟中处于优势地位并倾向于运用单一的控制机制——股权控制.没有退出期权的企业则更加依赖关系管理,联盟的股权控制与关系管理呈现互补特征.随着联盟中持有退出期权的企业数目的增加,联盟关系趋向于不稳定.与此同时,未来联盟收益越高,关系管理的作用就越大,两种控制机制的互补性就越强.Equity control and relationship management are two major control modes of alliance. Based on game theory, dynamic control decision of alliance is proposed to achieve the trade-off between the gain and the stability of alliance. The research results indicate that the hold capacity of exit option occupied by firms has significant impact on control characteristic and the stability of alliance. Firms which employ exit option have dominant positions in the alliance and they prefer to choose equity control instead of relationship management. Firms which do not adopt exit option prefer the relationship management and two control modes are complementary in such alliance. The relationship of alliance becomes more and more unstable with the number of finns which hold exit option grows. Meanwhile, with the future gains of alliance increase, the effect of relationship management grows, and the complement of the two control modes is strengthened.

关 键 词：动态联盟 控制 退出期权 博弈 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]