财政分权的博弈分析  

Analysis of Game about Fiscal Decentralization

作　　者：王文甫[1] 章辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学管理学院,合肥230039 [2]上海金融学院财政系,上海201209

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2008年第10期39-45,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：安徽大学人才建设项目资金资助;安徽省教育厅重点项目“欠发达地区建设现代农业的财政作为与责任分摊:以安徽省为例(2008sk138zd)”资金资助

摘　　要：构建一个完全信息两阶段博弈模型,分别对财政分权的两个极点—完全分权和完全集权进行讨论,研究财政分权对经济增长及社会福利的影响.The paper build two-stage game theory of perfect information to analyze decentialization extremes-full decentralization and full centralization, and study the effects of decentialization on economic growth and social welfare. The paper＇ conculsions are as follows： full decentialization is harmful to economic growth and the improvement of social welfare, compared with full centralization; full centralization is helpful to them though it make the tax rate of consumers higher, but it is uncertianty that full centralization enhaces each consumer＇s welfare.

关 键 词：财政分权 外部性 两阶段博弈 

分 类 号：F810[经济管理—财政学] F224.32