动态产量博弈模型的阈值控制  

The Limiter Control of a Dynamic Output Game Model

作　　者：卢亚丽[1] 唐仁春[2] 薛惠锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学工商管理学院,陕西西安710054 [2]中南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第3期59-64,共6页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：以双寡头企业动态产量博弈模型为研究对象,研究了产量上限控制和产量调整速度对两寡头企业产量和平均利润的影响。数值模拟及分析表明,边际成本劣势企业在产量混沌状态能够获得比边际成本优势企业更高的平均利润。理性的边际成本优势企业把其产量上限设定在其古诺均衡产量附近能够实现较高的平均利润,而两企业采用相同的产量上限控制策略具有共同获得超额垄断利润的可能。获取古诺均衡利润是两企业长期博弈的理想结果。边际成本优势企业通过降低其产量调整速度能够使两企业的古诺均衡利润容易地实现。另外,由于受到实际经济目标的限制,产量上限控制参数只能在低周期态的局部区域所对应的参数空间内取值才能够满足特定的经济要求,突破了人们对传统混沌控制概念的认识。According to the dynamic output game model, the effect of output upper limiter and output adjustment speed to the output and average profit of the duopoly enterprises were investigated in this paper. The numerical simulations and analysis show thatthe enterprise with inferior marginal cost can obtain higher average profit than the advantage one when the output is chaotic. In order to gain higher average profit, the output upper limiter of the rational enterprise with marginal cost advantage must locate in the neighborhood of its Cournot equilibrium output. The duopoly enterprises have the possibility to obtain excess monopoly profit with same upper limiter of output. Obtaining the Cournot equilibrium profit is the ideal result to the duopoly enterprises. The Cournot equilibrium profit can be easily realized by reducing the output adjustment speed of the enterprise with marginal cost advantage. In addition, the output upper limiter must locate in the specific parametric space which is mapped by the local region of the lower periodic state. Otherwise, the control result can not meet the specifically economic request. So the traditional concept of chaos control is broken through.

关 键 词：动态产量博弈模型 利润分析 阈值控制 产量速度调节 

分 类 号：F069[经济管理—政治经济学] F232