实现产业均衡的容量电价调整政策  

The Adjustment Policy of Capacity Payment:Achieving Electricity Industry Equilibrium

作　　者：叶泽[1] 曹永泉[1] 张新华[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学管理学院,湖南长沙410076

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第3期70-74,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473008;70501006);湖南省教育厅重点科研项目(04A003)

摘　　要：在需求不确定假设前提下,利用实用期权理论,建立了寡头竞争市场结构下的短期投资模型和长期博弈均衡模型。通过比较不同容量电价政策的长期均衡效果,本文发现,单一制电价下,长期容量投资将严重不足;除非完全固定容量电价水平能够事先精确地确定,两部制电价总体上并不会自动地诱导出长期市场投资均衡;本文提出的相对固定容量电价调整政策不仅能够更快地诱导出电力市场的长期均衡,而且可以实现比完全固定容量电价政策更高的竞争效率。Given that the demand is uncertain, this paper developed a model for the investors＇ action th e short-run and game equilibrium in the long-run in duopoly using Real Option Approach. Comparing results of different policies of capacity payment, we found ： Energy-only policy will result in under-investment in the long term ; completely fixed capacity payment policy is not able result in long-run market equilibrium automatically unless the value of the capacity payment is fixed exactly beforehand ; the adjustment policy of capacity payment proposed in the paper not only can achieve long-run market equilibrium faster but also has greater efficiency than completely fixed capacity payment policy.

关 键 词：两部制电价 不确定性 寡头竞争 产业均衡 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]