基于敌后侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力打击战法  

Tactics of Long-Range Fire Attack Based on Scout and Deception Game in Enemy Rear

作　　者：朱泽生[1] 孙玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]海军指挥学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《指挥控制与仿真》2008年第3期1-4,8,共5页Command Control & Simulation

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(30030090;39870534)

摘　　要：对敌后侦察反军事诱骗的远程火力打击战法的定量分析是战役研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战原理,运用仿真和统计学分析的混合方法,建立基于概率的二人非零和(TPNZS)非合作博弈模型,设计基于侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力打击战法,定量分析我方的敌后侦察和敌方的军事诱骗对远程信息与火力联合打击能力的影响,并对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与敌后侦察和军事诱骗有关的正确识别目标和错误识别目标的概率以及远程火力命中目标的概率是评估远程信息与火力联合打击能力的关键,而对评估结果进行博弈分析则是远程火力打击战法设计的关键,用识别正确目标和错误目标能力以及远程火力命中目标能力描述的基于敌后侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力最优打击战法为Δ*=(0,Δ2*,1-Δ2*)=(0.0000,0.7727,0.2273),被打击方对远程火力打击的最优战法为π*=(π1*,0,1-π1*)=(0.8511,0.0000,0.1489)。How to analyze quantitatively tactics of long-range fire attack based on scouting force against military deception in enemy rear is one of the most important open problems in research on disposition for a campaign. A probability-based two person non-zero sum （TPNZS） non-cooperative game model is built for analyzing the joint attack ability of long-range information and fire based on scouting force and deception game by using a mixed simulation-statistics method and information operation principle. The initial results of experiment and research on a typical example show that one of keys to develop the tactics of long-range fire attack is game analysis of the performance evaluation for joint attack ability of long-range information and fire with true and false target recognition probabilities as well as target kill probability of long-range fire. The optimal tactics of long-range fire attack based on scouting force and deception in enemy rear, described by true, false target recognition and target kill ability, is△＊=（0,△2＊1-△2＊）=（0.0000,0.7727,0.2273）, and optimal tactics of defending the attack is π＊=（π1＊,0.1-π1＊）=（0.8511,0.0000,0.1489）.

关 键 词：远程炎力战法 信息与火力 敌后侦察 军事诱骗 博弈 

分 类 号：E83[军事—战术学]