双头垄断市场中新技术研发投资的不完全信息博弈分析  

A Game Analysis with Incomplete Information for Enterprise R&D Investment in Duopoly Market

作　　者：张汉江[1] 陈声益[1] 李敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2008年第2期86-90,共5页R&D Management

摘　　要：产业内新技术的研究与开发是企业深层次竞争的重要手段.在新技术研发的结果表现为降低产品生产成本的假设基础上,将企业的研发投资分为两个阶段,各阶段以不完全信息的库诺特静态博弈为基础,建立了研究与开发的两阶段动态投资博弈模型.模型求解得到了企业研发投资成功率值、生产成本的降低值以及投资额之间的函数关系,发现了成功的研发投资将会推动企业下一期研发投资;通过算例仿真计算,得到了企业研发投资的无差异曲面.可供企业在新技术研究与开发投资时参考.The intra-industry R＆D has already been an important competition means among enterprises. It consideres a particular situation that R＆D can eventually lead to product cost reduction and enterprise＇s R＆D investment be divided into two stages. It uses the incomplete information to make static gambling analysis for each stage and then derives the two stages Cournot dynamic game model about enterprise R＆D investment. The study shows not only the function between success probabilities, product cost reduction and R＆D investment, but also the fact that successful R＆D investment has positive effect to R＆D investment in the next stage. Furthermore, it concludes the indifference surface of R＆D investment in the numerical example.

关 键 词：研究与开发 不完全信息博弈 投资博弈 垄断竞争 无差异曲面 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]