双重委托代理下的财务契约安排研究  

Research on Financial Contract Arrangement Based on Double Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：张庆[1] 何威风[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院,湖北武汉430205 [2]华中科技大学管理学院

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2008年第3期399-403,共5页Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(06BJY015);湖北省社会科学基金项目(2005058)

摘　　要：股权相对或高度集中下的股东异质性特征形成了控股股东与经营者、控股股东与中小股东之间的双重委托代理。财务契约是企业契约的核心内容,双重委托代理下财务契约安排的主要内容有:利益相关者理论是理论基础,资本结构是客观基础,财务控制权和财务收益权对称安排、财务共同治理和相机治理相结合是基本原则。Under the case of relatively or highly concentrated ownership, the characteristics of stockholder heterogeneity causes the double principal-agent problem between controlling stockholders and managers, and between controlling stockholders and middle-and-small stockholders. Financial contract is the essential content of corporate contract~ and in the main content of financial contract arrangement under double principal-agent situation, the theory of stakeholder is the theoretical foundation, capital structure is obiective foundation, and symmetrical arrangement of financial control power and financial income right, financial co-governance and contingent governance are basic principles.

关 键 词：双重委托代理 财务契约 利益相关者资本结构 

分 类 号：F235.99[经济管理—会计学]