政府危机管理的委托—代理理论浅析  

On the Principal-Agent Theory in Government's Crisis Management

作　　者：斯亚平[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江师范大学法政与公共管理学院,浙江金华321004

出　　处：《浙江师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第3期66-69,共4页Journal of Zhejiang Normal University(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：在公共危机管理的政府组织机制中,隐含着民众与政府及各级政府之间复杂的委托—代理关系,委托—代理理论中的委托—代理模型为解决地方政府博弈问题,加强对地方政府的监控,提供了解决途径和对策。委托—代理理论试图制定使代理人为委托人的利益而行动的刺激计划。因此,委托人所要重视的问题是如何根据这些观测到的信息来奖惩代理人,以激励其选择对委托人最有利的行动。该理论模型分析的目标是设计一个符合作为委托人的中央政府和地方民众的偏好的激励合同,以实现"委托人支付"的最大化,进而达到成功的危机管理之目的。In the government＇ s mechanism of public crisis management, there is a complicated principalagent relation between the people and the government and between different levels of the government. This principal-agent model offers a solution to the problem of gaming on the part of local governments, thereby effectively strengthening the control of the latter. The principal-agent theory attempts to establish an incentive mechanism that makes the agent act for the principal＇ s interest. Therefore, what the principal should focus on is how to reward or punish his agent based on the observable information, so as to encourage the latter to choose an action that can best benefit the principal. The analysis of this theoretical model intends to scheme an incentive contract that best satisfies the needs of the central government and the local people as the principal, so as to maximize ＂the principal＇ s payment＂ and achieve the goal of successful crisis management.

关 键 词：政府管理 委托人 代理人 公共危机 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]