基于逆向选择模型的景区门票最优定价机制研究  

A Study on the Best Mechanism of Making Price of Entrance Tickets Based on Adverse Selection Mode

作　　者：张明新[1] 姚国荣[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学旅游学院 [2]安徽师范大学经济管理学院,安徽芜湖241003

出　　处：《华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第2期73-77,共5页Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKF05-06D26);省高校青年教师项目(2006JQW048)

摘　　要：景区门票价格涉及两个主要的利益相关者:景区管理者和旅游者。文章通过构筑博弈模型,讨论双方由于信息不对称而导致相互间的逆向选择,并计算出该状态下景区产品的均衡价格和均衡质量,进而给出了这种逆向选择的经济分析,并在实践基础上提出改善这种逆向选择所导致的市场运行低效的策略。The price of the entrance tickets involves two main relating subjects of benefit：superviser in scenic spots and tourist. This paper discusses the adverse selection caused by the asymmetric information by constructing game model, figures out the proportional price and quality of the products in scenic spots in this condition. This paper also makes an economy analysis, and puts forward tactics which can ameliorate the inefficiency of the market operation resulted from the adverse selection.

关 键 词：逆向选择 信息不对称 景区 门票价格 

分 类 号：F59[经济管理—旅游管理]