基于委托代理理论的电子政务ASP外包模式研究  

Analysis on the model for E-government ASP outsourcing based on the principal-agent theory

作　　者：陆敬筠[1] 仲伟俊[1] 梅姝娥[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《科研管理》2008年第3期172-178,186,共8页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学资金(70471017，2005-2007)

摘　　要：本文探讨了在电子政务服务外包过程中政府和ASP之间的委托代理关系,建立了相应的博弈模型,并分别分析了在信息对称、政府向ASP支付固定服务费用及信息不对称的条件下,政府和ASP之间的博弈关系以及在不同的情况下政府应如何设计相应的激励机制,促使ASP提供高水平的电子政务服务,最大限度地满足政府的社会福利需求及ASP的效益需求,实现政府和ASP的双赢。A model of principal -agent theory between government and the Application Service Provider（ASP） is proposed. It is proved through the game analysis that the government fee policy to ASPs is the key reason to keep the better relationship with ASPs. The incentive mechanisms under the conditions of information symmetry, the fixed fee paid by government branches, and information asymmetry were analyzed. These incentive mechanisms would make ASP provide E - government services with high efficiency so that government and ASP could have a victory for both sides.

关 键 词：电子政务 应用服务提供商 委托代理 博弈 信息技术外包 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]