零售商对制造商实施纵向约束的机制和绩效评价  

Retailers to Manufacturers to Implement Vertical Restraints:Mechanism and Performance Evaluation

作　　者：石奇[1] 岳中刚[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学产业发展研究院,江苏南京210003 [2]南京邮电大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2008年第5期77-86,共10页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“零售商主导的纵向约束的理论与公共政策研究”(批准号07BJY077);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目“产业创新国际化背景下的国际代工模式升级:理论与政策”(批准号:苏教社政[2006]11号)

摘　　要：本文研究零售商主导的纵向约束的性质。已有的文献运用为分析单边市场结构而构造的理论和模型,假定零售商处于买方垄断地位。以这种方式来研究具有双边市场特征的纵向约束关系是不恰当的,其结论也没有获得实证检验的支持。本文基于双边市场理论,分析在零售商主导的市场环境下顾客、零售商、制造商三者的利益关系,对零售商主导的纵向约束进行绩效评价,并寻求相应的规制含义。This paper researches on the characteristics of vertical restraints dominated by retailers. Related literatures apply the theories and models based on the same industry and regard retailers as monopolization, which is not in accordance with vertical relations of different industries. The conclusions of related literatures are not testified by empirical research. Based on two-sided markets, the paper analyzes the economical interest of consumers, retailers and manufacturers in the market dominated by retailers, evaluates the performance of the vertical restraints, and makes exploration for regulatory implication.

关 键 词：纵向约束 零售业规制 双边市场 差异化战略 

分 类 号：F420[经济管理—产业经济]