Rent-seeking Game Analysis About Suppliers and Agencies in Government Procurement  

作　　者：Renjing Liu Jinling Li Xunlian Si 

机构地区：[1]School of Management, Xi＇an Jiaotong University, Xi＇an 710049, China [2]School of Economics and Management, Xi＇an Shiyou University, Xi＇an 710065, China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Information》2007年第1期1-6,共6页系统科学与信息学报（英文）

摘　　要：In government procurement, government and suppliers are connected for their interests, government and agencies are connected for commissions. This paper focuses on these two kinds of relationship and use rent-seeking game model to analyze the behavior of the government.

关 键 词：government procurement rent-seeking game Nash equilibrium solution 

分 类 号：F810.45[经济管理—财政学]