非对称管制下垄断企业R&D投入决策研究:价格竞争模型  

R&D Investment Decision of Regulated Firms under Asymmetric Regulation:A Price Competition Model

作　　者：刘新梅[1] 张若勇[1] 徐润芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2008年第2期80-84,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然基金项目资助(70473071);西安交通大学"985工程"<人口与经济社会可持续发展的政策与管理创新研究基地>资助项目

摘　　要：本文旨在探讨非对称价格管制对于双寡头市场上企业R&D投入决策的影响。通过构造无管制基准,对不同管制环境下价格竞争的均衡解进行分析,结果发现,非对称价格管制会对企业的R&D投入产生影响,政府许可的价格下调幅度δ的大小决定了影响的方向:(1)当δ足够大时,在位企业和新企业都会增加R&D投入;(2)当δ较小时,在位企业会选择减少R&D投入,而新企业决策者仍会选择增大R&D投入力度。This paper investigates the effect of asymmetric price regulation on R＆D investment in a duopoly market. Setting a non - regulatory （or symmetric regulation） benchmark, I analyze the equilibrium and give a comparison between R＆D investment level under different regulatory environments. The results show that, asymmetric regulation does affect R＆D investment, and the direction is dependent of the approved discount rate of price （marked Delta） stipulated by the government. Firstly, when in the condition a higher enough Delta, both incumbent firm and new entrant will increase their R＆D investment. Secondly, in the condition of a lower Delta, while incumbent firm decrease R＆D investment, new entrants enhances his R＆D investment as well.

关 键 词：R&D 非对称管制 双寡头垄断 价格竞争 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]