反思中国政府绩效评估实践  

Reflections on Contemporary Performance Measurement Practices in Chinese Government

作　　者：倪星[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学行政管理研究中心

出　　处：《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第3期134-141,共8页Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：2006年度教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目<中国地方政府治理绩效评估研究>(06JJD630021);中山大学二期"985工程"公共管理与社会发展研究创新基地专项基金

摘　　要：近年来,政府绩效评估在世界范围内大规模兴起。西方发达国家政府绩效评估的制度基础是成熟的代议民主制,通过分权、结果导向和内部市场机制改进了政府内部管理和工作流程,提高了政府管理效能。我国政府绩效评估的制度基础是科层制政府体系,上级与下级之间没有真正形成基于内部市场的分权、绩效合同和结果导向,仍然依靠命令—服从机制;绩效评估并没有改变原有的管理制度和程序,没有改变政府及其工作人员的行为模式,反而强化了科层制的优势。在政绩追求、赶超压力、政绩竞争等因素的影响下,我国的政府绩效评估很大程度上变成了一种计划式绩效评估,成为一种新的政治控制手段。Governmental performance measurement has widely taken root throughout the world recently.As for the developed countries in the west,mature representative democracy is the institutional base of performance measurement,through decentralization,result-orientation and internal market mechanism,to improve the internal management and work flow as well as managerial efficiency.While Chinese institutional foundation of governmental performance measurement is bureaucracy,where the decentralization of internal market,performance contracts and result-orientation have not been ultimately realized between the upper and lower levels.As a result,under the command-and-compliance mechanism,performance measurement emphasizes the advantages of bureaucracy instead of definitely changing the original managerial system and procedures as well as the behavioral model of both the government and officials.To a large extent,performance measurement in Chinese government has become a new tool of political control,that is,a planned performance measurement,under the great influence of pursuit and competition of administrative achievement and the emulation pressure.

关 键 词：政府绩效评估 公共管理改革 反思 政绩 

分 类 号：D623[政治法律—政治学]