基于佣金约束的排污权拍卖机制  

Research Emissions Permits Auction Model in the Conditions Commission

作　　者：顾孟迪[1] 张敬一[1] 李寿德[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2008年第2期173-176,共4页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70573073);上海哲学社会科学规划项目(2005BJB016)

摘　　要：基于传统的排污权拍卖机制只考虑买卖双方在最大利益原则驱动下厂商的最优出价策略、卖方的期望收益行为等特点,分析了佣金条件下排污权的私人价值和关联价值拍卖机制问题。结果表明,佣金对厂商的出价策略、环保部门和拍卖公司的期望收益都存在影响,佣金的比例与拍卖公司的期望收益同方向变动,与环保部门的期望收益反方向变动,而与厂商的期望收益无关。In the symmetry independent private value and affiliated value model which induced commission, this paper considers the bidding strategy in the emissions permits first-price and second-price auc tions. We find that the commission rate has effects on the bidders＇ bidding strategy, on the expected prof its of the seller and the auctioneer. The bigger the commission rate is, the more passively the bidder bids, and the fewer expected profit the seller makes, but the more expected profit the auctioneer has.

关 键 词：排污权拍卖 佣金 期望收益 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]