基于过度自信的资本市场委托代理关系  

Study on Principal-agent Relationships in Capital Market Based on Overconfidence

作　　者：王健[1] 庄新田[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110004

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2008年第2期189-195,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371062);高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20060145001)

摘　　要：从行为金融学角度,将过度自信行为考虑进激励机制及内部监督和外部监督的设计之中,分别研究了过度自信条件下市场微观和宏观层面上委托人与经纪人之间的委托代理关系。结果表明,市场微观层面上,经纪人的过度自信行为与委托人采取的内、外监督措施均可降低代理成本,两者在解决委托人与经纪人之间的代理问题中是相互替代、而不是相互补充的;市场宏观层面上,被雇佣的过度自信经纪人的人数比例,随其整体对市场自信程度的加大而上升。这两个层面所得结论在实际应用中相辅相成,从不同角度为解决资本市场中的代理问题提供了有益思路。By combining the behavioral finance theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper researches the principal-agent relationships of the market from both the micro point and the macro point. The result shows that from the micro point both overconfidence of the money managers and monitoring measures of the principals could augment the incentive intensity and reduce the agency costs, so they can substitute reciprocally. From the macro point, the proportion of overconfidence money managers that engage in the market will increase by their average confidence of the market. These research conclusions could provide some beneficial insights for solving agency problem in the capital market.

关 键 词：过度自信 激励 监督 委托代理关系 经纪人 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]