经理自利行为还是大股东掏空效应,抑或其它?——基于我国制造业上市公司的实证研究  

Managers Self-Seeking Behavior or First Stockholder Tunneling:A Empirical Study Based on China Manufacturing Industry Listed Companies

作　　者：雷新途[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济与管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2008年第3期40-46,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究青年基金项目(07JC630055);浙江省社科基金项目(07CGGL043YBM);湖南省教育厅科学研究一般项目(07C413)

摘　　要：依据西方经典公司治理理论，企业股权契约主导性冲突模式是经理自利行为的代理问题Ⅰ还是大股东掏空效应的代理问题Ⅱ，取决于股权契约结构的构造是松散还是集中。沿着这一思路。以我国2005—2006年度制造业上市公司共1371个混合数据为样本进行的实证分析发现，股权契约结构由松散逐渐趋向集中的过程中，公司绩效并未发生“上升-下降-上升”的变化，表明我国企业股权契约主导性冲突模式不能简单归类为代理问题Ⅰ或代理问题Ⅱ而具有特殊性。实证同时也发现，与西方经典公司治理理论分析相近的结论仅仅出现在民营控股的制造业上市公司中。According to western classic corporation governance theory, conflict model of equity contract which embodies managers self-seeking （agency Ⅰ ） or first stockholder tunneling （agency Ⅱ ） depends on the structure of equity contract . Based on 1371 samples from 2005-2006 pooled data of China manufacturing industry listed companies, this paper empirically studies conflict model of Chinese enterprise. The Empirical Study discovers company performance hasn＇t been ＂up-down-up＂ during the way going to the concentration of equity contract structure. It means that conflict model of chinese enterprise is special, and some conclusions in accordance with western classic corporation governance theory only reflects conflict model of manufacturing industry listed companies controlled by private investors.

关 键 词：股权契约 冲突模式 经理自利行为 大股东掏空效应 

分 类 号：F830.94[经济管理—金融学]