基于零售商促销努力的混合契约设计  

Hybrid Contract Design Based on Retailer Promotional Effort

作　　者：邓云[1] 卢光松[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥230009

出　　处：《价值工程》2008年第6期12-14,共3页Value Engineering

基　　金：安徽教育厅人文社科项目:供应链信息共享激励机制研究(项目编号:2008sk030)

摘　　要：在供应链协作中,供应商与零售商之间的合作尤为重要。零售商的促销水平极大的影响了产品的需求与销量,但促销活动同时也为零售商带来了额外的经营成本,经营成本的增加将导致零售商缺乏足够的积极性加大对促销活动的投入,因此需要供应商分担部分经营成本。利用回购契约与销量返利组合契约,分析了在允许二次进货的情况下供应商和零售商之间的利益关系,并设计了一种混合契约,以激励零售商为获得更多利润而加大促销努力的投入。In supply chain coordination, the cooperation between the supplier and the retailer is very important. The retailer＇s promotional effort level extremely affects the demand and the sale, and the sale promotion activities are costly. Due to the increased operating cost, the retailer may not have enough enthusiasm to enlarge investment for those activities, so it requires that supplier should share the cost of effort. In this paper a contract composed of bay back contract and sale rebate contract is given, and the benefit relation between the supplier and the retailer is analyzed in the case of restock. Then a hybrid contract is designed to stimulate the retailer to enlarge investment in sale promotion activities in order to gain more nrofit.

关 键 词：供应链协调 线性转移支付 STACKELBERG博弈 零售商促销努力 

分 类 号：F724.2[经济管理—产业经济] D923.6[政治法律—民商法学]