WTO后过渡期出口企业反倾销摩擦原因及对策的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Reasons and Countermeasures for Anti-dumping Friction of Export Enterprises during WTO Post-transition Period

作　　者：杜慧敏[1] 卓骏[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院

出　　处：《国际贸易问题》2008年第6期121-128,共8页Journal of International Trade

基　　金：中国国家自然基金项目"对华反倾销预警系统研究"(70371016)资助

摘　　要：入世使中国成就了贸易大国的梦想,但却是多年连续位居全球受反倾销调查指控最多的国家,中国的对外贸易正在陷入一轮又一轮的反倾销摩擦的囚徒困境之中。文章通过建立动态博弈模型,尝试性地寻求这一问题的内在博弈原因和应对策略,最后提出了"四体联动"应诉机制角色分工和分层预警机制的构想。Although China has achieved the dream of trading power, it has been receiving more and more anti-dumping investigations by the allegations than any other country. China＇s foreign trade trapped into the prisoner＇s dilemma of anti-dumping friction round by round. This paper, through the establishment of dynamic game model, tries to find the game reasons for this problem, and finally proposes an idea of “four-linkage” responding mechanism and layered early warning mechanism.

关 键 词：反倾销 动态博弈 四体联动 囚徒困境 

分 类 号：F752.02[经济管理—国际贸易] F224.32[经济管理—产业经济]