中国房地产市场管制中四大利益集团联盟的博弈分析  

Game analysis of four interest group's coalition in Chinese regulated real estate market

作　　者：淮建军[1] 刘新梅[1] 雷红梅[2] 张帆[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院 [2]西安交通大学医学院,西安710049 [3]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,西安710049

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2008年第6期30-37,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70473071);西安交通大学“985工程”项目(07200701)

摘　　要：为了回答中央政府在中国房地产市场管制中如何解决利益集团联盟导致房价飞涨的问题,基于合作博弈的方法,分析了中央和地方政府、房地产商和国际投机商在支持和反对管制两方面形成单人、两人、三人以及四人联盟的条件、联盟的最优形式以及维持联盟的利益分配向量.发现:管制净收益与市场调控平均净收益的关系决定管制与反管制联盟的形成的条件;最优的联盟形式取决于同类策略的四人支付和与反管制时福利总损耗的比较;维持联盟的个人向量由个人支付和反对管制的福利损耗确定.中央政府应该建立和维持"管制联盟"来瓦解"反管制联盟".To answer how central government resolve the question that interest group coalitions have induced rising price of housing in Chinese regulated real estate market, based on the cooperative game method, we investigate the conditions of single, two- and three- and four-coalition, the optimal coalition form and profit distribute vectors maintaining coalitions among local government, central government, land agents and international speculators, We find that： the conditions of regulated or anti regulation coalition are determined with the relationship between net profit from regulation and average net profit from market movement; the optimal coalition form depends on the comparing the sum of four payoff from the same type of strategy with the sum of welfare waste from anti regulation; individual profit distribute vectors for maintaining coalition are determined with individual payoff and welfare waste from anti regulation. Central government should build and maintain regulation coalition to overthrough anti regulation coalition.

关 键 词：房地产市场 联盟 合作博弈 政府管制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TU241[建筑科学—建筑设计及理论]