在线信息产品捆绑定价研究  

Study of online information goods bundle pricing

作　　者：张宇[1,2] 唐小我[2] 钟林[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南科技大学经济管理学院,四川绵阳621010 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2008年第3期331-337,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：西南科技大学博士基金资助项目(07SX7101);四川省教育厅重点资助项目(07SA018);教育部科学技术研究重点资助项目(105149);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20030614011)

摘　　要：基于在线信息产品交易各方的互动关系,考虑网络接入商与信息产品生产商各自市场垄断力的对比,研究了两者进行价格决策的先后顺序对信息产品捆绑的最终价格和对信息产品厂商采用捆绑销售策略的影响.研究结果表明当两者同时进行价格决策时,两者均分市场利润;当两者进行序贯博弈时,先决策价格者将获得先动者优势,且消费者在此情形下的总支付将大于当两者同时决策时的总支付;信息产品厂商采用何种捆绑策略与其决策顺序无关,仅与被捆绑产品的捆绑价值参数相关.Based on the interactions of three parts involved in transactions of online information goods, this paper considers the market powers of information goods producer and internet access provider respectively, and emphasizes on the influence of pricing order on the final price of information goods and the bundling strategies of information producer. The results show that： when information goods producer and internet access provider decide their prices simultaneously, they share the aggregate market profits equally, and in the case of sequentially moving, the first decider will obtain the first mover advantage and consumers have to pay more expenditures for the information goods than that in the simultaneously-moving case. However, whether to adopt bundling strategy is determined by the bundle coefficient index, rather than the price decision-making order.

关 键 词：在线信息产品 捆绑定价 竞争 序贯博弈 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]