政府、企业与公众环保行为博弈分析  

A Game Analysis on Environmental Behavior of Governments,Enterprises and the Public

作　　者：王凤[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,西安710069

出　　处：《经济问题》2008年第6期20-22,129,共4页On Economic Problems

基　　金：陕西省社会科学基金项目"陕西环境保护中的公众参与效果差别研究"的阶段性成果(06E031S)

摘　　要：党的十七大明确提出将节约资源和保护环境作为国家的一项基本国策,其中也包括公众参与机制建设和"全民环保"的新理念。将公众置于社会大系统之中,其参与环保行为多是依赖政府设计的制度框架,与企业环保行为间博弈选择的结果。在政府不参与模型中,公众也不会自觉参与环保,企业更不会停止污染,必将导致"公地悲剧";而在政府参与模型中,政府的奖励与惩罚力度又会直接影响到公众参与的人数和参与成本,进而影响到企业环保行为的选择。由此提出制度设计方面的政策建议,以期推进更广泛程度的公众参与。This paper place the public in a social system. The public participation in environmental protection is mainly dependent on the result of the Game choice between institutional framework designed by government and the environmental protection of enterprises. In the non - government participation model, the public will not consciously participate in environmental protection and the enterprises also will not stop polluting. This will certainly lead to the ＂tragedy of commons＂; In the government participate model, government＇s incentives and penalties will directly affect the number and cost of public participation, thus affecting the choice of corporate environmental behavior. Finally the author made a number of policy proposals about system design to increase public participation.

关 键 词：政府 企业 公众 环保行为 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.33[经济管理—国民经济]