基于博弈论的均衡股权结构治理模型研究  

A Research on Corporate Governance Model of Multi-Large Shareholders Based on Game Theory

作　　者：党文娟[1] 张宗益[2] 吴俊[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川外语学院国际商学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2008年第3期164-172,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金杰出青年基金项目(70525005);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(03JD630011)

摘　　要：在中国上市公司股权集中度比较高的前提条件下,人们认为国有股"一股独大"的集中股权结构是治理问题存在的根源,建立均衡的股权结构有利于改善公司治理。本文引入多个大股东均衡治理模型,进行完全信息动态博弈的建模和分析,分析的结论是:在目前的公司治理环境、传统文化背景条件下,均衡的股权结构的治理模式未必优于"一股独大"股权结构治理模式。治理结果取决于大股东之间相互博弈过程中的策略选择,而这些股东之间的策略选择与公司治理环境、传统文化、价值观等有关。最后文章在理论分析的基础上给出了一些结论和建议。Under the high concentration degree of stockholder＇s rights, the State-owned stock ＂a dominant shareholder＂ is the basic reason of corporate governance, establishesing ＂several equal-sized shareholders＂ structure would be advantageous to the improve the corporate governance. This article introduces many major stockholders model, carries on complete information dynamic game, and obtains the conclusion： ＂several equal-sized shareholders＂ structure governance is not the quite ideal governance pattern, at present ＂a dominant shareholder＂ governance pattern surpasses the ＂several equal-sized shareholders＂ government pattern, the government result is not only the result of these major stockholder＇s mutual gambling process ,but also the result of shareholder＇s cultural values. In the final, some conclusions and the suggestions based on the theoretical analysis are given.

关 键 词：股权结构 公司治理 均衡治理 

分 类 号：TP301[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]