资本监管与银行最优资本结构  

Capital Regulation and Bank's Optimal Capital Structure

作　　者：张天宝[1] 金永军[2] 陈柳钦[3] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [2]上海证券交易所,上海200120 [3]天津社会科学院,天津300191

出　　处：《南方金融》2008年第5期17-22,共6页South China Finance

摘　　要：资本监管已成为现代商业银行监管体系的核心,而现有研究对资本监管的重要性缺乏系统的理论研究。基于此,本文从MM理论出发,逐步分析并得出:银行自身经营的特殊性、银行作为一般企业所追求的企业价值最大化行为以及银行作为特殊企业所得到的银行安全网保护等因素使得银行形成不断提高最优资产负债率和降低资本充足率的内在机制,逐步分析不同情形下的银行最优资本结构,进而说明资本监管对于维系银行经营的稳健性和审慎性以及减少银行破产而导致的负外部性等方面的重要作用。Capital regulation has been the core of the regulation system of modern commercial banks while its importance has not been fully discussed theoretically. Based on the MM theory, this paper argues that due to the uniqueness of bank operation, the maximal profit seeking behavior as normal enterprise and the bank＇s safety net as special enterprise, a bank is subject to an internal mechanism to increase its debt to asset ratio and decrease its capital adequacy ratio. It also analyzes optimal banking structure under different circumstances and stresses the importance of capital regulation for maintaining the soundness and prudence of banking operation and for alleviating the negative externalities resulting from bank failure.

关 键 词：MM理论 资本监管 银行安全网 最优资本结构 

分 类 号：F830.42[经济管理—金融学]