地方政府和房地产商非合作讨价还价的博弈分析  

"Game" Analysis of Non-cooperative Bargaining Between the Local Government and the Land Agent

作　　者：淮建军[1] 刘新梅[1] 雷红梅[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院 [2]西安交通大学医学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2008年第3期70-74,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70473071);西安交通大学“985工程”项目(07200710)

摘　　要：为了探索地方政府退出与房地产商合谋的有效途径,本文应用Rubinstein轮流出价模型和Selten非合作博弈方法,在局部完美信息条件下,分析了房地产商与地方政府的非合作讨价还价过程。结果发现:在中央政府不断加强管制的条件下,地方政府与房地产商实施非合作讨价还价的均衡结果,取决于双方讨价还价的能力,地方政府理性管制的概率,以及房地产商检举投诉的概率和他们的收入水平。最后得出地方政府和房地产商之间的非合作讨价还价有助于加强管制的结论。To explore the effective way the local government stops the collusion with the land agent, based on the model of Rubinstein alternating offers and by the method from Selten non-cooperative game, this paper analyses the non-cooperative bargaining between the local government and the land agent with part perfect information. It finds that, facing the strict central government＇s regulation, the local government and the land agent can reach the non-cooperative bargain about regulation, whose game equilibrium rests with the capacity of bargaining each other, the probability of rational regulation of the local government, and the probability of prosecutions and the income of the land agent as well. We conclude that the non-cooperative bargaining between the local government and the land agent is good for reinforcing regulation.

关 键 词：公共管理 讨价还价 非合作博弈 政府管制 房地产市场 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]