走出政府机构改革困局--地方政府与中央政府的博弈分析与启示  

The Predicament of Government Institutional Reform——A Game Thoretical Analysis of the Relationship between Central Government and Local

作　　者：卢大鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院博士生,北京100084

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2008年第7期27-30,共4页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(项目编号:70573058)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：改革开放以来近30年的政府机构改革,始终未走出"精简—膨胀—再精简—再膨胀"的困局,需要从地方政府与中央政府博弈的角度来分析这种困局产生的根源。首先本文构建了一个在执行精简机构政策上的地方政府与中央政府两阶段博弈模型,通过分析得出政府机构改革困局根源于博弈过程中形成了"不精简、惩罚"或"不精简、不惩罚"的博弈纳什均衡;其次结合我国特殊的国情和体制,分析了上述两种博弈均衡产生的原因和变化;最后,认为走出政府机构改革困局的根本方法是通过制度改革改变中央和地方双方的博弈收益。In the past 30 years since the implementation of the open-door and reform policy, Chinese government institutional reform has been locked into a predicament. This article analyzes the root of this predicament through a game theoretical analysis of the relationship between central government and local govenments. According to the game analysis, it is found that the root of this predicament is that the central government and local governments have formed a Nash Equilibrium with two game results-- ＂no simplification, no punishment＂ or ＂no simplification, punishment＂ -in policy implementation game. Based on Chinese particuluar reality and institutions, this article not only analyzes the causes and changes of such a game equilibrium, but also argues that the best solution to this predicament is to change the benefit distribution of the inter-governmental game.

关 键 词：政府机构改革 执行博弈 困局 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]